D-Day - The Corry, Why Should the Army Get All the Headlines

22 Jun

This one was sent in by a regular supporter. I love doing the supporter chosen ships. I get to research ships I would never have thought on my own.

The Navy did more than just drop troops off at Normandy and go back to England for more (kind of a reverse Dunkirk). Those ships provided vital support without which the landings would not have happened. For more on their efforts, read Nick Hewitt's book, Normandy: The Sailor's Story. You can buy it here (please note, I get a commission if you buy it through this link, but the author gets some money and you get a great book, so its a win-win-win for everyone). If you want to hear him talk about his book, you can listen to History Rage Podcast here (I get nothing from this, I just like the podcast). Now the Corry’s deck logs were lost when she sank (spoiler alert). So this is based on the action report. In other words, taking a really broad definition of deck log here.

Let's have some background. The Corry was launched on December 18, 1941, so less than 2 weeks after Pearl Harbor. In pre-Day action,[ Newspaper Article September 9, 1945] she had gone after a submarine, along with another ship. According to the reports, her hits were vital in destroying the submarine and capturing 50 prisoners. Now the story of the Corry on D-Day.The Corry was the first destroyer lost in the invasion of France.[ Murrow Interview June 9, 1945] Her captain that day was Commander George Dewey Hoffman. If that name sounds familiar, its because Commander Hoffman was the godson of that Dewey. You know the one who said “You may fire when ready, Gridley.”

Prior to June 6, she was given her orders which included escorting a convoy across the Channel, and then to serve as a fire support ship. Her assignment was Fire Support Unit 3, off Utah Beach. At H Minus 2 Hours (H Hour being 0630 on June 6, 1944), she was to head down the boat lane toward Red and Green beaches along with two other ships. The goal was to proceed the landings and lay down cover fire. At H minus 80 minutes she was to leave the boat lane and head to her assigned fire support station with the intention of arriving on station at h minus 50 minutes.

Just before Corry was due to depart the boat lane, an unknown battery opened up on both the Corry and one of the other escort ships.[ All information came from the Action Report of June 19, 1944.] Corry returned fire at the unknown batteries. Corry still made it to the assigned station on time. The current was running strong the anchor was dropped. The orders were to direct fire at targets #80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92 and 94. Which numbered to the northwest. Firing to begin at h minus 40 minutes. The detail of which targets to aim for is a testament to the detailed planning that went into planning this landing. (Hold that thought). Firing was to continue until black smoke rocket signal was seen as the signal that the troops have landed, don’t hit them.[ Id, with added commentary by this author.]

Corry carried out her duties as assigned, right up until a few minutes after H Hour. Hoffman told Edward Murrow that he saw “waves of bombers overhead.[ Murrow Interview]” One was on fire, but still in formation, right until it blew up. These were the Allied air cover. A smokescreen was laid down to protect the fire statins ships[ Action Report] It worked extremely well and within 5 minutes all the ships were covered — except 1[ Action Report]. The Corry. The plane assigned to screen her was shot down[ Normandy: The Sailor’s Story by Nick Hewitt p. 169] (most likely not the one Hoffman saw shot down).

At H Minus 30 minutes, Corry began firing at Target #80.[ Action Report] Those targets were pillboxes and machine gun nests. They were shooting and the Germans were shooting back.[ Murrow Interview] They would shut up one battery and another would start up at them.[ Murrow Interview] This just made the gunners on Corry mad. They shot back faster and faster, determined to make the Nazis stop shooting at them. During this time, the anchor was lifted to begin maneuvers to avoid the incoming shots.[ Action Report] But, remember the part about all the planning that went into this operation? Everything was laid out with precision of where everyone had to be for this to work and have any chance of success. The Corry could only move so much.[ ] She had an assigned area and a duty to protect the troops landing. Anyone moves out of their area on the grid, there’s a problem. You either re-enact Sickles at Little Round Top and that almost disaster or you run the risk of running into your neighboring ship who can only maneuver in their assigned area, or you force that ship out of its assigned area. If you start pushing ships out of their area, then the next one goes, and then the next, etc. and the whole thing is then FUBAR.

But the movement helped. It decreased the angle at which the Germans could hit the ship, at least a bit. At least the battery that was firing at the time. The next one along the line just picked up as Corry came in range.[ Action Report] There she was just doing her duty, firing away. Then, just 3 minutes after H hour, disaster. The ship hit a mine right under engineering. Flooding was immediate. Power was simultaneously lost. Hoffman immediately rang for full speed, hard right rudder to get clear.[ Action Report] Hard right rudder might not have been the best move. The rudder jammed which sent the ship in circles.[ Action Report and Murrow Interview] There were reefs and the circles were likely to put her right on them. With power out, the only hope was to steer the ship by hand..[ Action Report] This got the ship headed out of the fire land and back to sea. But, Lady Luck had turned her back on Corry for a bit. Right as they head out to sea, steam goes out.[ Action Report] No headway could be made. Hoffman decided to put the boats over the side to tow the ship clear.[ Action Report] Which is a really good idea, except the hits literally and figuratively kept on coming. But at 0639, just 6 minutes after being hit, the men began to prepare to abandon ship.[ Action Report]

At 0641, they were ready. The ship was “broken amidships.[ Action Report]” The order was given to abandon the ship. The wounded were placed in available boats. Hoffman was the last to leave the ship as a good Captain should.[ Action Report] Then commenced true hell for the men. The water was freezing. The Germans were still firing at them which lead to more casualties. The currents were running that you couldn’t swim away from the ship,[ All from the Action Report] which you totally want to do in order not to be sucked into the vortex created when she sinks. One raft was just carried in circles around the ship and when it came around to the shore side, it was fired upon. She had sunk in shallow water, so it looked like she was still afloat which led to the shelling rather than having it shift to a more immediate threat..[ Hewitt, p. 169] But the men did their best. As Hoffman remarked in his interview “I am very proud of the way everyone kept calm and cheerful against the adversity of the extremely cold water and the shelling.[ Murrow Interview]”

Finally, beginning at 0830 when it was safe to do the survivors were rescued by nearby ships.[ Action Report] It could have been worse. 10 were killed and 14 injured, not counting the hypothermia from being in the water.[ Hewitt p. 170] That’s out of a complement of amost 300 officers and sailors. Hoffman would receive the Silver Star for his actions that day.

Now the big controversy because a lot was going on that day — did the mine or the shelling destroy the Corry. In his interview with Murrow on June 9, 3 days later, Hoffman said it was shelling that did her in. But in his Action Report 13 days after the events he says it was definitely a mine. So which was it? Hewitt in his excellent book says shelling. This author is going with the mine theory. Why? First, the interval of time. 3 days, you are still processing you don’t have all the information. It is clear from the Action Report that Hoffman had investigated and talked to other crew members. This is the key to why I agree with the Action Report “as a result of the review of the concussion effect through the ship and the revelation of the fact that practically every man on the ship was thrown frim his feet regardless of the location of his duty station.[ Action Report]” A shell hitting the ship wouldn’t have that effect everywhere on the ship. But a mine under the hull, breaking her spine would? And the sagging mentioned elsewhere, along with ‘broken amidships.” Seems more mine than shell. But short of a time machine to take one back to be present at the crucial moment, we may never know for sure. And even if that were to occur, it still might not be clear, fog of war and all that.

But one thing is clear — the Corry did her duty that day. The men aboard her fought bravely bought in battle and in dealing with the freezing waters. To the unknown sailor who swam back to the Corry and raised the ensign,[ Hewitt p. 169] we salute you.

To all the ships on D-Day who did their duty under heavy fire to protect the troops landing - Bravo Zulu.